THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CONNECTICUT CONCERNING HEARING IN DAMAGES ON DEFAULT, OR DEMURRER OVERRULED by unknown
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VOL. VI FEBRUARY, 1897 No. 3
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CONNECTICUT
CONCERNING HEARING IN DAMAGES ON
DEFAULT, OR DEMURRER OVERRULED.
Necessarily, we in this State are so satisfied with the law and
practice pertaining to hearing in damages on default and de-
murrer overruled, in actions sounding in tort for unliquidated
damages, that we forget that such law and practice are peculiar
to this State.
Whether the law and practice are founded on logical reasons
or not, they have proved in fact very beneficial in their operation.
The most frequent instance of their application is in actions for
negligence. If we should go into the courts of adjoining States
or England, we should find as a rule, actions for negligence tried
to a jury, with liberal verdicts for the plaintiff. In this State
such actions are generally tried to the court without the aid (or
annoyance, as you please) of a jury. As in other States, so here
the student will notice that such actions are tried on their merits.
In our State the plaintiff is sure to recover a nominal sum, and
in a majority of cases fails to recover more than a nominal sum;
while in other States the jury is found to sympathize with the
plaintiff more than with the defendant.
How did the rule and practice arise in this State?
In order to answer that question it is necessary to state the
condition. of a case after default, and after a demurrer overruled.
When a defendant has been summoned into court in any jur-
isdiction-7especially so in this State, where, with the summons,
there is left with him a copy of the complaint-and he fails to
appear, or if appearing, fails to answer to the complaint, he is
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said to be in "default." His attitude toward the case and court
is such that he is regarded as desiring to make no contest over
the allegations of the complaint, or over the assumptions of law
upon which such allegations are based. Everywhere, as is be-
lieved, save in Connecticut, such an attitude on the part of such
defendant is regarded by the Court as a conclusive admission of
the truth of the well pleaded allegations of the complaint, and as
entitling the plaintiff to a judgment for damages measured by
the extent of the injury.
In Connecticut also, in such cases of default, the plaintiff is
entitled to a judgment of some sort, the nature of which will be
discussed after we have brought into view the condition of a
cause after a demurrer overruled.
When a defendant has been summoned into Court as above
stated and desires to contest the suit, it is obvious that he may
dispute the assumptions of law contained in the plaintiff's case,
or question his allegations of fact. If he undertakes to dispute
the questions of law on which the plaintiff's complaint is based,
his method is by demurrer. If he wins the point his demurrer
is said to be "sustained." If he loses, the demurrer is said to
be "overruled." Thus far he has confined his attack upon the
plaintiff's case solely to the questions of law supposed to be in-
volved therein.
Now comes in a very interesting point, which illustrates the
length of time over which a peculiar practice may extend. By
the very old common law, the defendant in actions at law was
restricted to one substantial matter of defense. He could come
in and demur to the "declaration." If his demurrer was over-
ruled, final judgment went against him for the narrow and tech-
nical reason, that by electing to demur he had exhausted his one
opportunity of defense, and so had admitted the allegations of
the declaration, and could not afterwards contest them. In
other words, upon a demurrer overruled the old common law
placed the defendant in a condition of being in default, with ref-
erence to the allegations of fact contained in the declaration.
Ili the technical default, the defendant has declined answering
the allegations of the declaration or complaint. In the case of a
demurrer overruled the defendant by his own choice, according
to the principles of the ancient common law, has lost the oppor-
tunity of answering the allegations of the complaint.
It is very true that courts almost universally permitted the
defendant after demurrer overruled to plead anew with reference
to the matters of fact alleged in the complaint, but this was done
122
CONNTECTICUT PRACTICE.
purely as a matter of privilege to the defendant (Falken v.
Housatonic R. R. Co., 63 Conn. 262).
"The practice is undoubtedly more liberal in allowing a
change of plea in the case of a demurrer overruled, than in
allowing amendments to declarations which have been held to be
insufficient; but in both cases it is a matter of discretion with
the Court" (McAllister v. Clark, 33 Conn. 253, in which case the
motion to plead anew after demurrer overruled was denied).
Although the statute now makes it peremptory upon the court
to permit a defendant to plead anew after demurrer overruled,
it still remains optional with the defendant to further plead or
not as he chooses. If he does not further plead, then he is
regarded as standing before the court with no answer to the alle-
gations of fact in the complaint. His attitude toward the court
and case is, for all the purposes of this article, identical with
that of a defaulting defendant; in each case the law awards a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant.
On what ground does the judgment proceed?
Herein lies the mystery. It would seem as matter of logic
that the judgment ought to proceed upon the theory that the
allegations of the complaint setting up a cause of action were
admitted, fully and completely. On what other theory can a
court of justice render a judgment in favor of one man against
another, except that the one man has maintained or established
his cause of action against the other man?
It necessarily results that if the defendant will make no
answer to the allegations setting up the cause of action in the
complaint, a court may well say that thereby such allegations
are established in a very satisfactory manner-in a manner of
which the defendant at least, cannot complain.
The general rule of the effect of a default in actions of tort is
stated in the "American and English Encyclopedia of Law,"
volume 5, page 63, as follows:
"A judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff admits the
defendant's liability to some damages, but the amount is a mat-
ter of proof. The defendant is, therefore, not entitled to deny
the plaintiff's cause of action, but he may offer evidence in miti-
gation of damages."
In the case of Lambert v. Sanford, 55 Conn. 437, referring to
i Sutherland on Damages, page 777, it is said:
"It is generally held that on an assessment of damages after
default or on an equivalent state of the record, evidence denying
the cause of action, or tending to show that no right of action
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exists, is inadmissible in mitigation of damages. When an
action is brought on a contract set out in the declaration, and
there is a default on the assessment of damages, no evidence
which goes to deny the existence of the contract, or tends to
avoid it, is competent; the default admits it as set forth, and
concludes the defendant from denying it."
The opinion proceeds as follows:
"In this State in some actions of-tort, notably in actionis in
which negligence is of the gist of the action, evidence in mitiga-
tion of damages, which evidence also tends to show the non-
existence of some material element of the cause of action, is per-
mitted. But this rule never has been extended to actions upon
express contracts set forth in the complaint."
Thus it is seen that in this State courts have arbitrarily
drawn a distinction between the effect of a judgment by default
or on demurrer overruled, with reference to a cause of action in
contract, and one sounding in tort for unliquidated damages.
It may be asked why should the effect of judgments by de-
fault in the one class of actions be different from the effect of
judgment by default in the other class of actions.
In actions of tort, where the plaintiff obtains against the de-
fendant a valid judgment by default or on demurrer overruled,
it is hard, by the rules of logic, to find on what ground such
judgment can rest, except it be upon the cause of action stated
in the complaint. Necessarily the damages are unliquidated.
The defendant has never agreed what the damage was, and the
plaintiff desires to show the extent of his injuries, in order to
establish the amount of his recovery. If he shall fail to establish
any injury the law would presume some damage, because of the
conceded violation by the defendant of the plaintiff's rights.
When, however, the question of the extent of the plaintiff's
injuries is to be tried, it seems anomalous for the court to render
judgment, not for the actual damages shown, but for some nomi-
nal damages, because, forsooth, the defendant has been able to
show that the plaintiff never had any case at all, although he has
obtained a valid judgment.
In order to try to understand this matter it is necessary to
refer to some of the important cases in which the law and prac-
tice of the State of Connecticut on this subject have been estab-
lished.
The leading case is that of Havens v. Railroad Co., 28 Conn.
69, decided in 1859.
Here the points, so far as I can find, were first established
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that in a hearing in damages on default, or demurrer overruled,
the truth of the allegations of the complaint setting forth the
cause of action can be attacked, notwithstanding the judgment;
that the judgment arising from the default, or demurrer over-
ruled is, primia facie, only a judgment for nominal damages, and
that whatever be the basis of such judgment, it does not conclu-
sively settle the truth of the plaintiff's allegations concerning his
cause of action.
"Nominal damages mean no damages at all. In the quaint
language of an old writer, they are 'a mere peg to hang costs on.'
They are such as are to be awarded in a case where there has
been a breach of a contract, and no actual damages whatever
have been or can be shown" (Stanton v. R. R. Co., 59 Conn.
282).
So the judgment by default or demurrer overruled in actions
of tort, for nominal damages, in this State is not much of a judg-
ment, though it has some virility, as will be shown later.
The practical effect, however, of Havens v. Railroad Co. was
to cause these actions in tort to be tried to the court and not to the
jury, since in this State, from time immemorial, hearings in dam-
ages on default or demurrer overruled could only be to the
court, except as modified in a very recent statute, concerning
notice of intention to default, which has not materially changed
the course of procedure.
The doctrine first established in Havens v. R. R. Co. was
vigorously contested for many years. Perhaps it receives its
best and clearest statement in the case of Batchelder v. Bartholo-
mew, 44 Conn. 501:
"From a time early in the history of the jurisprudence of this
State, the law has been, that Where in an action on a case for
the recovery of unliquidated damages, the defendant has suffered
a default, that is, has omitted to make any answer, the assess-
ment of damages has been made by the court without the inter-
vention of a jury; also, that by his omission to deny them, the
defendant is held to have admitted the truth of all the well-
pleaded material allegations in the declaration, and the conse-
quent right of the plaintiff to a judgment for a limited sum, that
is for nominal damages and costs, without the introductio4 of
evidence. The defendant standing silent, the law imputes the
admission to him, but it does it with this limitation upon its
meaning and effect, it does it for this special purpose and no
other, and our courts have repeatedly explained that the admis-
sion found in a default is not the admission of which the writers
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on the law of evidence treat. The silent defendant having been
subjected to a judgment for nominal damages, from which no
proof can relieve him, the default has practically exhausted its
effect upon the case; for if the plaintiff is unwilling to accept
this judgment evidence is received on his part to raise the dam-
ages above, and on the part of the defendant to keep them down
to that immovable base of departure, the nominal point, precisely
as if a general issue had been pleaded, and although the evidence
introduced by the latter has so much force that it would have
reduced them to nothing but for the barrier interposed by the
default, it cannot avail to deprive the plaintiff of his judgment;
in keeping that, the law perceives that he has all that the truth
entitles him to, and therefore refuses to hear any objection from
him. Of course the Court might have said that if the defendant
thus defaults he shall not hereafter be heard in proof or argument
upon any other than the single question as to the extent of the injury
inflicted, but it has contented itself with saying that if he stands
silent the law will pronounce judgment upon him for nominal
damages; in either form, the rule, like all other rules of practice, is
arbitrary in its nature, but in neither is there any inconsistency or
want of logic. If in our courts the admission in a default had
ever been used in the broadest sense of which the word is capa-
ble, then, of course, any limitation thereafter put upon it would
have been an inconsistency, but from the earliest use, the nar-
rower meaning went with it" (citing no case or authority prior to
Havens v. Railroad Co.).
It will be observed that the rule of Connecticut is cor-
rectly asserted to be a rule of practice, and arbitrary in its nature;
but when the court says that there is neither inconsistency or
want of logic in the rule, the inquiry may be properly made, how
a judgment by default conclusively establishes the truth of the
allegations of the cause of action in an action of contract, and
does not so conclusively establish them in an action of tort?
The practice under the rule of Connecticut was, at the outset,
somewhat uncertain. Should the plaintiff in these actions of
tort introduce his whole cafe in chief, the same as if there had
been no default, or should he confine himself to the extent of the
injury? In some counties the practice was one way, and in
some the other, and some lawyers in the same county tried their
cases in one way, and some in the other.
In Daniels v. Saybrook, 34 Conn. 377, the court apparently
decided the question: holding that the effect of a judgment by
default or upon demurrer overruled, was such as to confer upon
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the plaintiff, prima facie, the right to his full damages, and re-
quiring him upon the hearing to show in the first place only the
amount of such damages; making it, however, only a question
of the burden of proof, and throwing upon the defendant the
burden of proving that the plaintiff had no cause of action, in
case such was the real defense of the defendant.
This case was decided in 1867, yet notwithstanding the decis-
ion the practice continued more or less uncertain until the decis-
ion of Crane v. Eastern Transportation Line, 48 Conn. 361,
decided in October, 188o. It is now well settled in this State
that the Connecticut rule and practice on these hearings in dam-
ages, after a judgment by default, or demurrer overruled, are
that the plaintiff is prima facie entitled to recover his full dam-
ages, and on such hearings, offers in chief only evidence as to
the extent of his injury, while the defendant is at liberty to show
that the plaintiff never had any cause of action at all; the burden
of proof in this respect being upon him.
In other words, we have established in Connecticut a most
peculiar form of judgment by default or demurrer overruled in
actions of tort for unliquidated damages. Prima facie, and in a
peculiar way, such judgment establishes the truth of the allega-
tions of the complaint concerning the cause of action. In point
of fact, it probably establishes nothing of the kind. In point of
logic the inquiry must arise, "How can a judgment prima facie
establish anything?" The general conception of a judgment is
that it is conclusive, or is nothing.
It was contended at one time, that the allegations of the
complaint, after default, or demurrer overruled, might be re-
garded as priia facie evidence of the facts therein asserted, so
that if the defendant failed to negative such allegations in his
defense, such allegations might be regarded as sufficient proof
of such facts. The Supreme Court, however, says that such is
not the law; that the allegations of the complaint in such cases
are not to be taken as evidence in any manner: they probably
are true, for purposes of the burden of proof, but such proba-
bility vanishes when the defendant attempts, however unsuc-
cessfully, to disprove them (Nolan v. R. R. Co., 53 Conn. 46 1;
Crogan v. Schiele, 53 Conn. i86).
While the practical effect of the Connecticut rule and practice
with reference to the" judgment by default or demurrer over-
ruled, is beneficial, I cannot subscribe to the assertion that it is
entirely logical and consistent with other established rules and
maxims.
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It is a case of a prima facie, probably correct judgment,
which the defendant, however, is allowed to prove the plaintiff
was never entitled to obtain, but which, even then, the defendant
may not be able to wholly set aside, but must suffer, for an amount
which is now expressed by the phrase "nominal damages."
In its final form, if the plaintiff is successful, it is the ordi-
nary judgment by default for the plaintiff to recover damages
measured by the extent of his injuries.
In its final form, if the defendant is successful, it is a judg-
ment for the plaintiff to recover "nominal damage's," not be-
cause the plaintiff has proved a violation of his rights and shown
no injury, for in such cases the defendant has not violated the
plaintiff's right, and the plaintiff has usually suffered consider-
able damage. It is not a judgment against the defendant,
because he has not filed an answer to the allegations of fact in
the complaint, for he may "default" after filing such answer,
and be dealt with as is usual in cases of default (Lennon v.
Rawitzer, 57 Conn. 583).
I have never been able to satisfactorily define the rules of
law and practice of this State, on this subject, in any other man-
ner than to say that they are arbitrary and constitute a system
of judicial procedure peculiar to this State, in actions in tort for
unliquidated damages.
A curious illustration of the rule is found in Martin v. New
York and New England Railroad Company, 62 Conn. 331; an
action against a railroad company for communicating fire from
its locomotive engine to adjoining property. In this case it is
held that the liability of a railroad company in such case is
statutory and does not depend upon the existence of negligence.
The complaint alleged that fire was communicated to the
plaintiff's property by a locomotive engine of the defendant,
and that the property was destroyed by fire. The defendant
suffered a default, and the case was heard in damages. Held,
that the plaintiff was, prima facie, entitled to recover her actual
loss from the fire, to the full extent proved, but the defendant,
to reduce the damages to a nominal sum, might show that the
fire was not communicated by its locomotive; in other words,
the default did not conclusively admit the vital allegations of the
complaint, that the fire came from the locomotive engine of
the defendant, and this in a statutory action, where negligence
of the defendant need not be alleged or proved.
Obviously the extent to which the rule will be applied in
Connecticut is as yet unknown.
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It would seem as if in actions of slander and libel the defend-
ant could default or demur, and on a hearing in damages on such
default or demurrer overruled, could show that he never uttered
the slanderous words, or published the libellous matter.
For some years the General Assembly has made it a condi-
tion precedent to suits brought against municipal and other cor-
porations that notice of the time and place of the injury must be
given by the plaintiff within a limited time, to the defendant.
In an action against the City of New London the complaint
alleged the giving of sufficient notice. The case was defaulted.
On the trial of the case the defendant offered in evidence the
notice which in fact had been given, and which was defective;
a fact which would have entitled the defendant to a judgment in
its favor, if the case had been tried, whether to court or jury.
What was the effect of the default upon the sufficient allega-
tion of the complaint concerning notice?
A result was reached by which the plaintiff was entitled to a
judgment for nominal damages by virtue of the default, and
the defendant could attack the allegations of notice in the
complaint, notwithstanding his default with reference to it. As
this decision was in 1893, it is well to quote from it:
"This makes it necessary to consider very briefly what mat-
ters, in cases like the one at bar, under our practice, may be
contested by the defendant upon a hearing in damages, after
default, or demurrer overruled, for the purpose of keeping the
damages down to a nominal sum. As a general proposition, it
must now be regarded as conclusively settled that the defendant
in such cases, and for such purposes, may contest his liability
for any damages whatsoever; may show if he can, that the
plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages only, because in reality,
and but for the default or demurrer, he is entitled to none; may
offer evidence in effect tending to prove such non-liability, as if
no demurrer had been introduced, or default had been suffered,
although such fact as a basis for nominal damages had been
conclusively admitted. * * * For the purposes indicated
and after default suffered or demurrer overruled, the defendant
has been permitted to show that an assault by servants of a rail-
road company was justifiable, and so was in law no assault"
(apparently rendering pleadings or notice of special defense
wholly unnecessary) " * * * that a claimed trespass was in
law no trespass, because the acts were done under a contract
with the plaintiff, which amounted to a license."
Now a license surely may not ordinarily be offered in evi-
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dence by the defendant except by way of special defense, but
apparently it is permissible on a hearing in damages.
It seems to me that it would have been more logical, and
more consistent, if the Supreme Court had ruled that the default
or demurrer overruled admitted nothing with reference to the
merits of the case, and left the burden of proof with the
plaintiff to make out his claim for substantial damages.
I think also that the early case of Lamphear v. Buckingham,
33 Conn. 237, is not in harmony with the later decisions. That
was a case of an administrator suing a railroad company (oper-
ated by Buckingham and others, trustees) for the loss of the life
of the intestate, through the negligence of the railroad company.
If the case for negligence was made out the statute fixed the sum
to be recovered, as not less than one thousand dollars nor more
than five thousand dollars.
On a hearing in damages on demurrer overruled the Court
found that the railroad company was not guilty of any negli-
gence, and fixed fifty dollars as the "nominal damages." The
Supreme Court decided that the judgment for nominal damages
on the demurrer overruled, was at least one thousand dollars.
Thus in this case the judgment for nominal damages assessed
at fifty dollars, became in fact a judgment for substantial dam-
ages of one thousand dollars, in the teeth of the conclusive
finding that the defendant was guilty of no negligence, and that
the plaintiff had no case except from the demurrer overruled.
It is not to be understood that we are criticising any decision
rendered by the Supreme Court as at present constituted. The
law and practice on this subject were settled thirty-five years ago
in Havens v. R. R. Co., 28 Conn. All that has occurred since
has been simply but a development of the doctrine therein
announced. The General Assembly alone can alter the rule of
law in this State, which has been so long established.
The rule has worked admirably. In Connecticut, actions of
negligence against corporations, private or municipal, against
horse, steam or electric railway companies, and private individ-
uals, have been tried to the court in one of the two peculiar
methods above described. Nominal damages have been any
where from one dollar to one hundred dollars, depending upon
some process of judicial reasoning not capable of exact descrip-
tion or analysis. The judgment carries with it also plaintiff's
costs.
The result has been a confidence on the part of such corpora-
tions and individuals that they would be fairly dealt with in
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actions of this character, and that their property would not be
imperilled by the uncertainty of jury trials. There can be no
question about the superiority of a trial by the court instead of
by the jury in actions of this character, if the attainment of jus-
tice is to be regarded.
So, also, the General Assembly has sustained the peculiar
law and practice of the State which I have attempted to describe.
Efforts have been made in the General Assembly to cause this
whole system to be overthrown, yet such efforts have always
come to nothing.
It may be confidently asserted that the rule and practice will
rather be extended than contracted.
In establishing the law and practice in this State in hearings
in damages on default or demurrer'overruled in actions in tort
for unliquidated damages, our Supreme Court has accomplished
very beneficial results by the use of something closely akin to a
"legal fiction."
There is nothing strange in this regard. The use of "fic-
tion" in the English courts has been frequent and salutary.
Moreover Connecticut always has been and still is a State
noted for invention.
John W. Ailing.
